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ABSTRACT
This study analyzed the relationship among capital structure, cash holdings and firm value for a sample of publicly traded Brazilian firms, 
through panel data regressions, employing the fixed-effects estimator. Initially, it was estimated regressions between capital structure (debt 
to total capital) and cash holdings (cash to assets), as well as between cash holdings and short and long-term debt. Next, it was applied a 
regression among firm value, capital structure and cash holdings. The results of this study suggested that debt, both short and long-termed, 
is negatively related to cash holdings, and that the level of cash holdings is also associated to a lower leverage. The study also presented 
indirect evidence that financially constrained firms hold more cash. Regarding to the impact of the capital structure on the firm value, 
short-term debt, long-term debt and the financial constraint had negative marginal effects on the firm value, suggesting a risk-averse 
behavior of investors in relation to debt. Cash holdings, instead, is valued as positive by investors, but up to an optimum threshold level. 
Further, the market capitalization is discounted with respect to cash holdings (inverted U-curve), in synergy with static trade-off theory 
of cash holdings.  
Keywords: Capital structure. Cash holdings. Firm value.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
In a so called “perfect market economy”, in which 
there are no frictions, transaction costs and taxes, the 
way firms’ investments are financed would be irrelevant 
for the firm value, as proposed by Modigliani and Mil-
ler (1958). However, it is clear that financial markets 
cannot be defined in such ways. As argued by Portal, 
Zani, and da Silva (2012), frictions and transaction 
costs are indeed real constraints that firms must face 
when choosing their financing strategy. Considering 
this setup of frictions, transaction costs and asymme-
try of information in debt markets, and also building 
on Harris and Raviv (1991), the choice between debt 
and equity financing, and the resulting level of leverage 
might affect firm value. 
Sunder and Myers (1999) argue that among the many 
theoretical frameworks proposed to evaluate the ratio-
nal and consequences of capital structure choices, two 
theories are the most prominent: the static trade-off 
theory and the pecking order theory. The static trade-
off theory argues that there is a target level of debt-to-
equity ratio, in which the present value of tax-shields 
(tax benefits) would equal the financial distress cost 
(bankruptcy risk), point in which firm value would be 
maximized (Sunder & Myers, 1999). The Pecking Or-
der Theory, instead, proposes that the level of debt of a 
given firm does not follow a target, but just an order of 
preference of financing options determined by availa-
bility and cost of resources. Firms would contract debt 
when they cannot balance their resource requirements 
for financing new projects with their internal cash ge-
neration (Myers, 1984).
Regarding cash holdings, a similar discussion was 
proposed in former research. The static trade-off mo-
del of liquid assets, by Miller and Orr (1966), predicts 
that firms balance the main cost of holding cash, which 
is the opportunity cost of holding no interest-bearing 
money, versus the main benefit of holding cash which 
is to guarantee funding for future investments in the 
event of  a cash flow shortage. Optimum cash would be 
set when marginal cost and benefit intercept. It follo-
ws from the existence of an optimum value for cash 
holdings that the cash policy can impact firm value. 
On the other hand, a Pecking Order of cash holdings 
should yield similar predictions as for leverage: no tar-
get level of optimum cash, as cash would be used as a 
buffer between retained earnings and investment needs 
(Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).
Other stream of literature considers cash just as nega-
tive debt. As argued by Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 
(2007), the view that cash is negative debt would hold 
only if financial markets were frictionless. If there are 
contracting costs and costs arising from asymmetry of 
information, as argued by authors, these costs should in-
fluence the financing policy of firms, and cash holdings 
would have indeed an economic value, not being only the 
reverse of debt. Cash holdings would play an important 
role especially for financially constrained firms, as they 
face higher costs to access external financing. Moreover, 
many past studies documented a negative relationship 
between leverage and cash holdings (Ferreira & Vilela, 
2004; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999; Bi-
gelli & Sanchez-Vidal, 2012; D’Mello, Krishnaswami, & 
Larkin, 2008).
The Brazilian setup is an interesting environment to 
study the problem. Because due to long dated economic 
policies, the cost of capital is much higher than in more 
developed countries and many firms suffer from credit 
constraints (Terra, 2003). Also, the debt market in Brazil 
is less mature when contrasted to US or European ma-
rkets, with less transactions and lower liquidity (Sheng 
& Saito, 2008). Other interesting feature is that because 
emerging economies, including Brazil, tend to have hi-
gher interest rates when compared to more developed 
economies (Neumeyer & Perri, 2005), the opportunity 
cost of holding cash is higher. Hence, a study combi-
ning the financial leverage and cash holdings policies 
can yield interesting insights about how these variables 
behave in a financial market that can be restrictive, in 
which firms can run short of cheap capital to finance 
their investments.
Moreover, in a financial market characterized as 
such, it is interesting to assess how financing and cash 
policies can affect firm value. Because of high costs, 
is debt perceived as negative by investors, and, if it is 
affirmative, does the maturity of debt (short or long-
term) influence firm value differently? Considering a 
high opportunity cost of holding cash coupled with the 
possibility of facing restrictions to finance future in-
vestments due to financing cost escalation, how is the 
cash holdings position of a firm priced by investors in 
terms of impact on firm value?
The study had three main objectives. First, we stu-
died the capital structure decision of Brazilian firms, 
with special interest in the relationship between leve-
rage and cash holdings. Next, we analyzed the deter-
minants of cash policies, with marked interest on the 
impact of short and long-term leverage, but controlling 
for other important variables. Finally, we evaluated the 
impact of capital structure and cash holdings policy 
on the firm value, also controlling for other relevant 
variables. This paper brings interesting contributions: 
First, we combine capital structure and cash holdings 
approaches in a single study and try to improve kno-
wledge on how these variables relate. Many papers 
studied capital structure and cash holdings separate-
ly, but fewer studies conciliated these important topics 
in a single study, especially in Brazil. Thus we seek to 
bridge this gap. Second, we evaluate how capital struc-
ture and cash holdings policy affect firm value in the 
Brazilian economic environment, which has peculiar 
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and important financial characteristics that differ from 
other economies that have more mature and developed 
financial markets. There were many former studies do-
cumenting theoretical rationales for both capital struc-
ture and cash policies to affect firm value, but not so 
many papers addressed the problem empirically, and 
even fewer (if any) evaluated how capital structure and 
cash holdings affect firm value in a single study, leaving 
room for further investigation. We tackle this problem 
in our study, hence presenting contributive insights.
 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
 2.1 Capital Structure.
Many former studies aimed to establish determinant 
factors of capital structure. Although, depending on the 
departing theory, different assumptions can be made about 
the relationship between variables and capital structure 
levels, some general patterns have been identified (Smart, 
Megginson, & Gitman, 2007). We shortly review some of 
the most important determinants.
Leverage has an important within-industry pattern, whi-
ch means, firms usually choose capital structure in ways 
that it would converge to the average of the industry (Ho-
vakimian, Opler, & Titman, 2001). Larger firms usually rely 
more on debt, as the firm size itself is trustworthy collateral 
for guaranteeing the service of debt or the payment of the re-
sidual cash in case of liquidation (Rajan & Zingales, 1995).
Growing firms normally present growing cash flows 
too, so debt financing is usually replaced by internal 
funding. Also, growing firms are riskier, so the finan-
cial distress cost should be higher, hence implying less 
debt (Frank & Goyal, 2009). In the same direction, Pe-
robelli and Fama (2003) argue that growing firms are 
more prone to rely on the equity market to finance new 
projects. In the same line, Kayo and Famá (1997) found 
that leverage is lower for growing firms for a sample of 
Brazilian companies.
The more profitable the firm is, the less debt it ten-
ds to employ (Kayhan & Titman, 2007). The same re-
sult was reported by Futema, Basso, and Kayo (2009), 
analyzing Brazilian public companies. Since profitable 
firms can accumulate profits, they may use retained 
earnings to finance new investments, using debt only 
after running short of internal resources. A similar re-
asoning may apply to cash flows. As argued by Jensen 
(1986), firms that generate more cash flows can use the-
se resources to redeem debt, and by having high cash 
flows, managers don’t need external financing (Ferreira 
& Vilela, 2004). Hence, leverage is likely to be decrea-
sing on cash flows.
As argued by Ferreira and Vilela (2004), the rela-
tionship of cash holdings with leverage can have two 
possible forms. First, because more levered firms want 
to reduce the risk of financial distress, as the cost of 
amortization plans of debt is likely to put a burden on 
firm’s treasury, they could hold high quantities of cash. 
On the other hand, because the leverage ratio is a proxy 
for the credit status of a firm or its ability to issue debt, 
higher leverage can be associated to lower cash holdin-
gs. However, as suggested by D’Mello, Krishnaswami, 
and Larkin (2008), cash holdings could be endogenous 
to leverage. The argument is that, as the determinants 
of cash are so closely related to the determinants of le-
verage, it is interesting to assess whether they are two 
sides of the same coin, similar to the discussion deve-
loped by Acharya et al. (2007) that suggested that cash 
could be negative debt.
Following the static-trade off approach, as argued 
by Sunder and Myers (1999), escalated costs of debt 
should lead to a situation in which the cost of debt is so 
high that firms can’t keep increasing borrowing. Also 
following Pecking order, if the cost of debt becomes too 
high, it may overcome even the cost of other sources 
of funds, like equity. Hence, increasing costs of debt 
should lead to a reduction or at least  saturation point 
of leverage.
One last important determinant of debt that we ap-
proach in the review is the role of stock market liquidity. 
It is because firms’ stocks that show high trading volume 
allow these firms to rely more on the equity market for 
financing, high liquidity usually affects capital structure 
by reducing the level of leverage (Lipson & Mortal, 2009; 
Morellec, 2001). One other result that relates stock market 
activity with leverage is the one reported by Dimitrov and 
Jain (2008), in which growing debt is associated to negative 
stock market returns.
Under an Agency-Theory perspective, the decision 
on which source of financing will be chosen by firms 
reflects conflicts among managers, equity holders and 
debt holders. Contracting debt implies that the firm 
will have to face the cost of this option by doing cash 
payments in the future, in such ways that managers 
would have less cash available to spend in general ex-
penses. Debt financing could be a way equity holders 
could monitor and constraint manager’s expending 
behavior (Jensen, 1986).
Agency conflicts between equity holders and debt 
holders can emerge from opportunistic behavior, prin-
cipally from equity holders. As argued by Harris and 
Raviv (1991), the debt financing allows for the possibi-
lity that the investment to be financed with such debt 
may yield higher returns than the face value of debt, 
thus equity holders may have an incentive to invest in 
riskier projects, as they capture the differential gains. 
If the riskier projects are successful, equity holders are 
better off, whereas if these projects fail, costs are borne 
by debt holders, conflict known as “asset substitution 
problem”. However, if debt holders anticipate the futu-
re behavior of equity holders, the costs of investing in 
riskier projects will be borne by equity holders, where-
as the cost of debt already incorporates the higher risk 
by having a higher cost (spread).
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Under the agency-theory approach, optimal capital 
structure would be obtained by balancing the agency 
costs and the agency benefits of debt among all cash 
claimants (Leland, 1998). As the financing by debt 
would be a way to balance power and expectations 
among all cash streams claimants, the final impact of 
leverage into firm value is considered to be positive 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991).
Bradley, Jarrel, and Kim (1984) argue that, instead, 
optimal capital structure is a function of the trade-off 
between the tax benefits of debt and the associated 
costs (risks) of bankruptcy. Firms would reach optima-
lity of capital structure precisely by balancing the be-
nefits and costs of financing options (Bancel & Mitto, 
2004). That is the main postulate of the Static Trade-off 
Theory of capital structure.
For Sunder and Myers (1999), the static model is based 
on the existence of an optimality point between the present 
value of the benefits of tax shields and the present value of 
costs of financial distress, being the firm value maximized 
when these two elements equate on their margins. Tax be-
nefits arise because firms can deduct the interest cost of 
debt from the taxable profits, booking the paid interest 
as a financial expense (Procianoy & Schmitt, 1995). On 
the other hand, the marginal cost of financial distress is 
a growing function of the debt level, so the more levered 
the firm is, higher is the probability of bankruptcy (Smart 
et al., 2007). Once firms have identified this point of op-
timality, they would target the resulting capital structure 
level. So the decisions of issuing more debt or switching 
for internally funding over time would reflect this chase 
of an equilibrium point of debt-to-equity ratio in which 
firm value is maximized.
The concept of asymmetry of information is the 
underpinning for other two important capital struc-
ture theories. Ross (1977) proposed a model in which 
managers may use the proportion of debt to signal to 
stock market investors that the future prospects of the 
firm are actually better than what is incorporated in 
the stock prices. Since managers are insiders and hence 
are better informed, they will be more accurately to as-
sess than outside investors what are the future earnings 
streams for the company.
Issuing more debt would be a signal of the high qua-
lity of the future cash flows, and assuming that only hi-
gh-quality firms would bear the risk of issuing debt (that 
means, this signal could not be falsely imitated by low-
quality firms), managers would opt for financing new 
projects with debt to signal good future prospects, being 
compensated by superior performance and penalized by 
growing bankruptcy risks. This model is known exactly 
as the Signaling Theory of capital structure, and predicts 
that, given the fact that debt signals good news about the 
firm, more levered firms would exhibit better stock ma-
rket performance (Harris & Raviv, 1991). On the other 
hand, Dimitrov and Jain (2008) reported that growing 
debt is associated to negative stock market returns, con-
tradicting the expected results of signaling theory.
The Pecking Order theory, differently from the other 
theories we discussed so far, departs from another con-
cept. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that if inside ma-
nagers are better informed then outside investors about 
the current value of the firm’s equity, it implies that equity 
may be mispriced by the stock market.
Hence, financing new projects by issuing new equity 
would make underpricing even more severe, and the new 
investors who acquired the recently issued shares would 
capture value at the expenses of prior shareholders. Under 
these conditions, managers would forego even projects with 
positive net preset value, preventing value destruction for 
current shareholders. Firm then would go through an unde-
rinvestment process. The way to solve this underinvestment 
problem would be to finance new ventures using a security 
that is not so undervalued (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Internally 
generated resources and debt (at acceptable risk levels) are 
sources of funds that do not involve undervaluation.
For Sunder and Myers (1999), the choice among in-
ternal cash flows, debt and equity as financing option 
is done considering the cost of funds. The less costly 
funds would be internal cash, followed by (moderated-
risky) debt, and finally, equity would be issued as a last 
option. Pecking Order theory advocates that leveraging 
is a way to reply for a punctual demand for funds, nor-
mally when the internal cash flows are not enough to 
finance new investment opportunities, simply a cost-
benefit decision.
 2.2 Cash Holdings.
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) ar-
gue that managers that maximize shareholder value 
would set the firm’s cash level such that the marginal 
benefits of cash equals the marginal costs of holding 
these assets. The benefits of holding cash are mainly 
that the firm saves transaction costs when raising fun-
ds, also avoiding liquidating assets to make payments, 
and further because firm has independency to finance 
investments with these liquid assets, not being harmed 
when other sources are not available. The main cost of 
holding cash arises from the liquidity premium dis-
count, also defined as the opportunity cost of holding 
cash. Clearly, this is a static trade-off approach.
On the other hand, under a pecking order theory 
assumption, firms would not have target cash levels. 
Instead, cash is used as buffer between retained ear-
nings and investment needs. Basically, when retained 
earnings are not enough to finance new investments, 
firms use cash holdings to do so, and in the last cir-
cumstance, they issue debt (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). 
Furthermore, there is a fixed cost of accessing external 
funding, so firms raise external capital infrequently, 
therefore relying more often on cash holdings to finan-
ce projects (Opler et al., 1999).
Departing from an agency-theory approach, cash 
holdings are kept high by entrenched managers, be-
cause they prefer to hold cash than to payout more di-
vidends to shareholders (Bates, Kahle, & Stulz, 2009). 
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Furthermore, by holding more cash, managers incre-
ase the amount of assets under their control and gain 
more power over the firm investment decision. Mana-
gers also would escape from raising capital externally, 
which in turns allows them to not disclose information 
about investment projects to the outside investor ma-
rket (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) point out four basic 
reasons why firms would hold cash. The first reason 
would be the transaction costs motive, in the sense that 
firms hold cash to avoid incurring in the costs of con-
verting a non-financial cash asset into a more liquid 
asset, to have resources to meet payments due. The se-
cond reason is called the precautionary motive, as fir-
ms hold cash to better cope to adverse shocks when 
external financing is costly.
The third reason is about taxes, because by holding 
more cash firms can mitigate tax burdens of repatria-
ting profits from foreign operations (this reason is clo-
sely linked to multinational firms). Finally, the fourth 
reason would be agency implications, as we discussed 
before, because entrenched managers tend to build 
more excess cash balances.
One first determinant of cash holdings would be 
the magnitude of the costs to access external funding. 
Firms with facilitated access to capital markets and 
good credit rating from rating agencies should have 
lower transaction costs when accessing debt markets, 
so they are expected to hold less cash. On the other 
hand, following Acharya et al. (2007), financially cons-
trained firms, which can be firms with less easy access 
to capital markets or firms that are already paying a 
very high cost of debt due to escalated risk of existing 
outstanding debt, seeking to avoid to be short of funds 
to finance investments, would hold more cash. 
In a similar fashion, firms facing high investment 
opportunities are likely to hold more cash, because the 
cost of being short of cash is letting these projects go 
away (Han & Qiu, 2007). So to possess the required re-
sources for investing in positive NPV projects, firms 
would hold excess cash. Also, the type of investments 
may matter, as firms investing more in R&D and ex-
pending more in advertising, sales expenses and other 
discretionary outflows are likely to hold more cash, 
because the cost of financial distress for these firms is 
higher, due to a higher proportion of intangible assets 
in comparison to hard assets (Opler et al., 1999). Con-
versely, higher asset tangibility is associated to lower 
cash holdings (John, 1993). 
Another determinant of cash holdings strictly linked 
to cash availability is the uncertainty of cash flows.  Hi-
gher uncertainty of cash flows, or risk, should imply 
more cash holdings (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004), as uncer-
tainty leads to more situations in which the firm has 
more outlays then expected.
For firm size, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) argue that 
depending on the theory approach the expected cash 
holdings may be opposite. Under a static trade-off as-
sumption, there are economies of scale in cash manage-
ment; so bigger firms would hold less cash then smaller 
ones, also because recurring to external funding is usu-
ally less costly for large firms. However, under a pe-
cking order analysis, larger firms are prone to be more 
successful, and hence should hold more cash, after con-
trolling for investment.
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) discuss whether large cash 
holdings can hinder operating performance, in the sense 
that large cash reserves could induce managers to deploy 
assets in a less efficient way, because there is too much cash 
available to spend. They find that, actually, higher cash re-
serves are associated to higher operating performance.
Prior studies on US public companies showed that fir-
ms commit themselves to regular payment of dividends, 
to reduce managerial agency costs, as firms must regularly 
come back to equity market to raise new funds to finance 
investments. Thus, firms do not adjust their payout po-
licy due to performance very frequently, and the expected 
result between cash holdings and dividends payment is a 
negative relationship (Bigelli & Sanchez-Vidal, 2012).
Finally, more levered firms are expected to hold 
less cash, as debt grows when investment exceeds re-
tained earnings and falls when investment is less than 
retained earnings. Cash holdings follow the inverse 
tendency, falling when investment needs exceeds re-
tained earnings and growing when the opposite takes 
place. However, as pointed by Portal, Zani, and da Silva 
(2012) and Acharya et al. (2007), when firms are sub-
ject to high external financing costs (constrained fir-
ms), internal and external funds are more complemen-
tary than substitute forms of financing, so the inverted 
relation between cash holdings and leverage may not 
prevail, as cash holdings and cash flows are positively 
related (a similar discussion to the difficulty to access 
external financing we did previously).
 3 METHODS
 3.1 Sampling and Data.
Our sample consists of all non-financial firms listed in 
the Brazilian stock market (BOVESPA – São Paulo Sto-
ck Exchange), in the period between 2002 and 2012. The 
sample includes firms from all non-financial sectors of 
the economy, and hence we consider it as a good repre-
sentation of Brazilian business environment. We collected 
yearly observations for each firm, in a panel that spans 
from 10 years, which allows capturing a whole decade of 
business activity. We did not restrict firms in the sample 
to contemporaneous listing, to maximize the heterogenei-
ty of the sample. As a result, the panel is unbalanced, as 
many firms went public exactly during the period covered 
by the sample, so we don’t have the same quantity of ob-
servations for all firms sampled.
Data was collected from Economatica Investment 
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Tool. We removed outliers that presented inconsistent 
financial ratios which let us understood that could be 
caused by imprecise figures in the database (like ex-
plosive financial ratios), and we also eliminated obser-
vations which let us understood that would not fit a 
study of capital structure, like firms reporting negative 
equity due to accumulated losses. For the variables that 
we managed to build the largest panel possible, we run 
models with up to 2.038 observations concerning 288 
different firms during 2002-2012 (having some firms 
presented missing variables in some years). When in-
cluding some controlling variables that were not avai-
lable in the database of Economatica for some firms, 
or for some years, models had reduced numbers of ob-
servations, but no less than 1.101 observations for 209 
different firms. Hence, we considered that for both the 
largest and the smallest panels we used to estimate the 
regression models, the sample was comprehensive and 
heterogenic enough.
 3.2 Empirical Models.
In this section we present the regression models we es-
timated. Following Wooldridge (2004) and Gujarati (2006), 
we employed panel data regressions using the Fixed Effects 
estimator, generally defined as:
Y is the dependent variable for firm i in time t;
alpha is the firm-varying linear coefficient (constant);
betas are the angular coefficients;
X and W are independent (explanatory) variables;
epsilon is the residual.
To ensure that the models were estimated respecting 
the main assumptions of the linear regression’s model, we 
conducted appropriated tests. To prevent problems with 
heteroskedasticity, we used heteroskedastic robust stan-
dard errors. To test for serial autocorrelation of residuals, 
we used the Durbin Watson statistic. Finally, we checked 
for possible cases of multicollinearity among regressors 
by analyzing the correlation coefficient among them, 
making sure there were no strong correlations that could 
signal multicollinearity.
The first model relates capital structure to cash holdin-
gs, also controlling for important variables. Model 1 is pre-
sented below:
D/Cap is Debt to Capital, defined as the book value of total 
debt divided by the book value of equity plus the book va-
lue of total debt;
C/TA is cash holdings, defined as cash divided by the total 
book value of assets;
lnTA is the log of Total Assets;
Y
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ROIC is the Return on Invested Capital;
EB/TA is the ratio of gross cash flows (EBITDA) divided 
by Total Assets;
NetCapex/TA is Capital Expenditures net of depreciation 
divided by Total Assets;
FE/EB is Financial Expenses divided by EBITDA, linear 
and quadratic forms;
Liq is the liquidity ratio, calculated by dividing the stock’s 
trading volume in R$ millions by the Market Value of Equi-
ty in R$ Millions;
Epsilon is the residual.
Debt to Capital is the dependent variable of the mo-
del, and was defined as previously explained. The main 
independent variable of interest is Cash Holdings. For 
controlling purposes we used the natural log of Total 
Assets (lnAT) for size, Net Capex to Total Assets is a 
proxy for growth / investment opportunities. Return 
on Invested Capital (ROIC) is the proxy for profitabili-
ty. EBITDA over Assets (EB/TA) is a measure for gross 
cash flow generation capacity. Financial Expenses di-
vided by EBITDA (FE/EB) in its linear and quadratic 
form control for the effect of escalating costs of debt 
service on the debt level, and finally the Liquidity (Liq) 
controls for stocks’ traded volume.
The second model relates cash holdings to long-
term and short-term debt, controlling for important 
variables that may impact cash holdings. Model 2 is 
described next:
C/TA is cash holdings;
stD/Cap is short-term debt to capital1;
ltD/Cap is long-term debt to capital2;
sqrtMVE is the square root of the market value of equity;
NetCapex/TA is Capital Expenditures net of depreciation 
divided by Total Assets;
PPE/TA is Property, Plant & Equipment divided by Total 
Assets;
SGA/NOR is Selling, General & Administrative expenses 
divided by Net Operating Revenue;
NOR/TA is Net Operating Revenue divided by Total As-
sets, the Assets Turnover;
Beta is the beta coefficient of firm’s stock;
DivYld is the dividend yield;
Constr is a dummy for potential financially constrained 
firms.
In the model exposed above, Cash Holdings is the 
dependent variable, and Short and Long-term Debt to 
Capital are the main independent variables. We split 
debt into short and long-term debt to assess whether 
the debt maturity can have a different impact on cash 
holdings, as suggested by Ferreira and Vilela (2004). 
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1 Short-term debt is the sum of the book value of short term loans, inancings and debentures divided by total capital, which is the book value of total debt plus the book value of equity.
2 Long-term debt is the sum of the book value of long term loans, inancings and debentures divided by total capital, which is the book value total debt plus the book value of equity.
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The other variables in the model were used for con-
trolling purposes, to allow for a ceteris paribus effect of 
debt on cash holdings.
The square root of market value of equity (SqrtMVE) 
is controlling for size, following Amihud (2002), being in-
cluded, in accordance with the literature, as smaller firms 
are likely to hold less cash (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Opler 
et al., 1999). NetCapex/TA captures the real investment, 
as investment may affect cash positively, because firms 
investing more are more likely to better investment op-
portunities, and thus would hold more cash (Han & Qiu, 
2007). PPE/TA is a proxy for asset tangibility, as firms 
with a more tangible assets base are likely to keep lower 
cash balances (John, 1993).
SGA/NOR is a proxy for discretionary expenses, like 
advertisement and other general and selling expenses, 
building on insights that firms with more discretiona-
ry expenses must hold more cash to cope with these 
cash outlays (Fresard, 2010). NOR/TA or Asset Turns 
is a proxy for operating performance / efficiency, follo-
wing insights of Mikkelson and Partch (2003) that too 
much cash reserves could affect efficiency negatively. 
Beta was used to proxy for firm’s risk, as riskier firms 
should hold more cash (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004), and 
DivYld is our variable to proxy for firm’s payout po-
licy, building on the prediction that dividend payment 
should be associated to lower cash holdings (Bigelli & 
Sanchez-Vidal, 2012).
The variable Constr is a dummy for financially 
constrained / unconstrained firms. To define if a firm 
is potentially financially constrained / unconstrained 
we used a different approach compared to prior stu-
dies, and the insight to use it came from ex post our 
estimation of the model on debt. Anticipating some of 
the results, we found that Debt to Capital and Financial 
Expenses over EBITDA3 present an inverted U-shaped 
curve relationship. It means that after the leverage le-
vel is associated to a high cost, as a higher fraction of 
gross cash generated (EBITDA), is necessary to pay the 
service of debt, the debt level starts to marginally fall. 
In other words, on average, there is a threshold for the 
cost of debt that maximizes the leverage level of firms. 
From that point, leverage falls.
The idea is that growing levels of committed gross 
cash flows to pay debt would create a situation of fi-
nancial constraint, because the firm could not contract 
more debt4. If the firm presented a value for FE/EBI-
TDA on the 75% percentile of sample, we considered 
that a high fraction of cash flows was allocated to pay 
debt service, and the value of 1 was designated for it, 
being the firm considered potentially constrained. If 
the value for FE/EBITDA was inferior to the 75% per-
centile, the value designated for the dummy was zero. 
D’Mello et al. (2008) also used a dummy variable to 
capture possible capital constraints, but they used a bi-
nary rule for rated debt, instead.
To double check for the intuition that we could cap-
ture financial constraint by this method, in one of the 
models developed in the study we regressed the Market-
To-Book ratio against the dummy Constr, among other 
explanatory variables, to assess if investors would dis-
count the value of financially constrained firms (as de-
fined in our methodology) differently from financially 
unconstrained firms. We are going to present the output 
for this regression in the later section of results, but we 
anticipate that the firms we set as potentially constrained 
were further discounted in comparison with the ones we 
set as unconstrained5.
The third model explores the relationship among firm 
value, capital structure and cash holdings, controlling for 
important variables. Model 3 is presented next:
MKB is the Market to Book ratio (Market value of assets 
divided by book value of assets);
stD/Cap is short term debt divided by total capital6;
ltD/Cap is long term debt divided by total capital7;
C/TA is cash to assets (cash holdings);
C/TA squared is cash to assets in the quadratic form;
Constr is the dummy for potentially financially constrai-
ned / unconstrained firms;
(Constr)x(stD), (Constr)x(ltD) and (Constr)x(C/TA) are 
interactions between the dummy Constr and short-term 
debt, long-term debt and cash holdings;
lnNOR is the natural log of Net Operating Revenue (Size);
Net Capex to Total Assets is the variable for investment op-
portunities;
ROIC is return on invested capital, for profitability;
Liq is the liquidity ratio, controlling for stock’s liquidity;
Epsilon is the residual.
Market-to-Book ratio (MKB) is the dependent variable, 
Cash Holdings (C/TA), in linear and quadratic forms, Short 
and Long-term Debt to Capital (ltDebt/Cap; stDebt/Cap) 
and Financial Constraint (Constr) are the main indepen-
dent variables. We also control for the impact of Liquidity 
(Liq), Size (lnNOR), Investment Opportunities (NetCapex/
TA) and Profitability (ROIC) on firm value. We also allo-
wed for interactions between the Constr dummy with Cash 
Holdings and Short and Long-term Debt.
It is important to discuss our choice to use distinct 
3 Financial Expenses over EBITDA is commonly used as a covenant in debenture issues to signal high levels of risk due to growing debt costs that would trigger an earlier liquidation of the debenture. Usually it is stated 
as EBITDA / FinExp, but we inverted it to have a ratio, thus facilitating the comparison of the elasticity to the debt-to-capital ratio. 
4 In this approach we are considering that irms are debt-constrained. We did not incorporate any measure of equity constraint, for example. 
5 Besides, we further correlated the Constr dummy with other three variables that according to past studies would be negatively correlated to inancially constrained irms (Acharya et al., 2007; Almeida & Campello, 
2007): a) NetCapex/Assets, as a proxy for current investment (Corr=-0.08, p-value < 0.01). b) Market-To-Book, as proxy for future investment opportunities (Corr=-0.11, p-value <0.01). c) ln Tangible Assets (Total 
Assets – Liquid Assets): (Corr.=-0.21, p-value < 0.01).  The negative and statistically signiicant correlations further suggest that we captured at least partially the inancial constraint with our dummy. 
6 Short term debt is the sum of short term loans, inancings and debentures divided by total capital, which is total debt plus the book value of equity.
7 Long term debt is the sum of Long term loans, inancings and debentures divided by total capital, which is total debt plus the book value of equity.
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models in the study, instead of employing simultaneous 
equations. There is theoretical support for a model su-
ggesting that capital structure and cash holdings may 
affect firm value (mainly the static trade-off theory, as 
discussed previously). However, to test the converse, 
that cash holdings and capital structure may be caused 
by the firm value is a more complicated relationship that 
has no such strong theoretical support, being not reaso-
nable to assume beforehand that this relationship may 
hold for the models proposed in this study. Some studies 
documented that the market value of the firm may serve 
as collateral for borrowing, causing some endogeneity 
between firm value and leverage, but it applies to pure 
financial firms (Adrian & Shin, 2010). However, our 
sample does not contemplate this kind of firms.
Furthermore, if the information regarding leverage 
and cash policy influences firm value, this information 
conveys relevant news to investors and thus must have 
a price. If we assume that firm value, leverage and cash 
holdings are set simultaneously, at the moment inves-
tors price a firm’s stock they should know what are the 
relevant figures for cash and leverage, but as these fi-
gures are proprietary information of the management 
of the firm, the best investors can do is to try to guess 
what these values are, but they don’t know for sure, 
being exactly this the reason why firm value should ad-
just ex post to information on cash policies and levera-
ge when these are released. Thus, having no theoretical 
base to suggest reverse causality or simultaneity among 
firm value, cash holdings and capital structure, neither, 
prior evidence of endogeneity among the three varia-
bles, we preferred to use separate equations.
Former studies suggested a possible endogeneity of 
leverage in the determination of cash holdings, as cash 
could be negative debt. However, as argued by Acharya 
et al. (2007), cash holdings are an important component 
of firms’ optimal financing structure, being correlated to 
firm value, growth opportunities, risk and performance. 
Cash policies would be affected by a range of aspects, 
from access to capital markets to laws protecting minority 
investors, but literature largely suggests that cash holdings 
should not be seen as negative debt for a large fraction of 
firms, as cash would fulfill an important economic role. 
Moreover, the standard valuation models that give intui-
tion for cash to be just negative debt assume frictionless 
in financing markets. If we assume that contracting and 
information frictions entail additional costs to external 
financing (Acharya, Almeida, & Campello, 2007), cash 
holdings will hardly be just negative debt, having an auto-
nomous economic value. Considering the Brazilian finan-
cing market case, credit restrictions are very pronounced, 
especially for small and medium sized firms, building on 
the argument of Terra (2003). Thus, in a restrictive finan-
cing market, we understand that it is more likely that cash 
holdings indeed play a role, weakening the argument that 
cash holdings is just the reverse side of debt.
To provide support to this view, we tested for the en-
dogeneity of leverage in the determination model of cash 
holdings, using the instrumental variables approach, as 
suggested by Wooldridge (2004). The instrument for le-
verage we used was the Average Sector Leverage ratio, 
following D’Mello et al. (2008), as it affects firm choice 
for leverage, because firms target their industry’s leverage 
ratio when deciding on their own ratio (being a relevant 
instrument), but it does not affect the cash policy directly, 
acting on the dependent variable only through the pos-
sible endogenous variable, which is leverage (being exo-
genous). For simplicity we used the total Debt to Capital, 
instead of dividing it between short and long term, to fa-
cilitate the implementation of the instrument.
The main idea of the test is to first estimate a reduced 
equation, which is similar to the structural equation (the 
equation we want to estimate initially, in our case, the mo-
del for cash holdings), but the dependent variable in this 
reduced equation is the possible endogenous variable (le-
verage), the main independent variable is the instrument 
(Sector Average Debt), and the controlling variables are the 
other regressors of the structural equation. The reduced 
equation is shown below:
One important condition is that the coefficient for the 
instrument must be statistically different from zero to en-
sure relevance (in our model, coefficient beta1 for Avg-
SectorDebt). After estimating the reduced equation, the 
residual of this regression is to be included as a regressor 
in the structural equation, and in the case that the residu-
al of the reduced equation is correlated with the residual 
of the structural equation (being a significant regressor in 
the structural equation regression), indeed the hypothesis 
of endogeneity holds. The residual of the structural equa-
tion becomes a function of the residual of the reduced 
equation (Vit) plus an error term (Nit).
Finally, we replace the residual epsilon, as defined abo-
ve, in the structural equation:
The main condition for the endogeneity to hold is that 
the coefficient Gamma1 must be statistically different from 
zero. We rejected this hypothesis, thus concluding for the 
model of cash holdings we specified that leverage is not en-
dogenous (results are reported in the next section). This 
finding suggested that using separate equations would be 
more appropriate, as in the absence of endogeneity among 
variables, the Fixed Effects estimator is more efficient than 
the Instrumental Variables or Two-Stage Least squares esti-
mators, as the Fixed Effects estimator applies OLS after the 
demeaning of variables (Wooldridge, 2004).
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 4 RESULTS
 4.1 Descriptive Statistics.
 Table 1  Descriptive statistics for the sample  2002/2012
Mean St.Dev 25% Perc. Median 75% Perc. N
Cash/Assets 0.125 0.137 0.020 0.080 0.175 2346
Debt/Cap 0.377 0.249 0.175 0.382 0.548 2358
ST Debt/Cap 0.161 0.167 0.04 0.114 0.222 2357
LT Debt/Cap 0.215 0.189 0.030 0.188 0.346 2358
AvgSectorDebt 0.377 0.037 0.356 0.369 0.397 2358
lnTA 13.9 2.0 12.7 14.0 15.2 2358
lnNOR 13.3 2.2 12.2 13.5 14.7 2262
sqrtMVE 13.2 2.3 11.6 13.4 14.9 2358
ROIC 0.138 0.288 0.040 0.080 0.149 2311
NOR/TA 0.702 0.554 0.300 0.600 1.100 2357
MBK 0.894 1.300 0.246 0.542 1.070 2348
FE/EBITDA 0.356 0.256 0.157 0.298 0.532 1668
Liq 0.332 2.270 0.002 0.102 0.238 2007
PPE/TA 0.317 0.241 0.09 0.301 0.487 2358
SGA/NOR 0.254 1.29 0.108 0.164 0.253 2147
Beta 0.799 0.674 0.30 0.60 1.1 1299
Div. Yield (%) 2.95 4.50 0 1.30 4.10 1748
Constr 0.460 0.498 0 0 1 2358
EB/TA 0.129 0.103 0.06 0.109 0.173 2229
NetCapex/TA 0.04 0.08 0 0.02 0.05 2191
The Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics for the variables analyzed in the study:
In the analysis of descriptive statistics we focus on 
cash holdings and debt levels, as they are the main va-
riables of interest of the study. Average Cash to Assets 
ratio was 12.5% of cash over total assets. Firms in the 
lowest 25% percentile had on average only 2% of cash 
out of total assets. Median cash holdings was 8% of cash 
out of total assets, whereas firms in the 75% percentile 
had cash positions of over 17% of cash out of total assets. 
Comparing these numbers with prior studies, Opler et 
al. (1999) reported that the average cash-to-assets ratio 
(assets net of cash) for their sample of US publicly traded 
firms was 17%, with median of 6%. Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) reported a cash-to-assets ratio of 10% for publi-
cly traded UK firms. Bigelli and Sanchez-Vidal (2012) 
found cash-to-assets ratio of 10% of privately held Ita-
lian firms. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) reported 14.8% of 
cash-to-assets ratio for European firms. We can notice 
that cash holdings of Brazilian firms are roughly in the 
same pattern, being slightly higher comparing the mean 
with the UK evidence and the median with the US evi-
dence. Compared with European firms, cash holdings of 
Brazilian firms are roughly in the same proportion.
For Debt to Capital, the mean was 37% of debt out of to-
tal capital. Low debt firms in the 25% percentile had 17% of 
debt to total capital, whereas firms in the 75% percentile pre-
sented debt to capital ratios of over 55%. Opler et al. (1999) 
reported 21% of debt to assets ratio, whereas Ferreira and Vi-
lela (2004) documented 24% for the same variable. For better 
comparison sake, Debt to Assets for Brazilian firms was 28%, 
a figure close, but slightly higher than for US and for Europe-
an firms. Long-term Debt was 21.5% of total capital, whereas 
Short-term debt was 16.1% of total capital employed.
 4.2 Results of Regressions.
 Table 2  Determinants of debt
Dep.Var:  
Debt/Capital
 KABł?EAJPO PR=HQA /K>QOP0"
C/TA -0.100* -1.67 0.059
lnTA 0.068*** 5.28 0.013
NetCapex/TA 0.088* 1.87 0.047
ROIC -0.001 -0.62 0.001
EBITDA/TA 0.044 0.56 0.080
FE/EBITDA 0.356*** 4.19 0.085
(FE/EBITDA)sq -0.169* -1.96 0.086
Liq 0.006 0.77 0.008
F(8,280) 14.4***
N 1574
Firms 275
Adj. R-squared 0.2113
DWatson 2.40
Var(u_i) 0.7581
Max. correl.8 0.57
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level
8 Max. correl. Is the highest correlation coeficient among regressors, excluding the correlation among polynomials, which is naturally high. Because the highest correlation is far from being perfect, there are no 
signals of multicollinerity.
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Table 2 summarizes results for Model 1. Debt to Ca-
pital ratio is the dependent variable, whereas Cash Hol-
dings is the main independent variable in which we are 
interested. The regression is statistically significant, pre-
senting an Adjusted R-squared of 0.2113. Cash Holdings, 
measured by Cash-to-Assets ratio is negatively related to 
leverage (-0.10; p-value < 0.1). Firm size, measured by 
the natural log of assets, is positively related to leverage 
(0.06; p-value <0.01). Leverage is increasing in growth 
/ investment opportunities, as measured by the NetCa-
pex/TA (0.08; p-value < 0.1). Profitability (ROIC) and 
Gross Cash Flows to Total Assets (EB/TA) were not sta-
tistically different from zero. The relationship between 
Financial Expenses to EBITDA (FE/EBITDA) and leve-
rage is not linear, as both the linear and quadratic forms 
of the variable are statistically significant (Linear form: 
0.356; p-value < 0.01; Quadratic form: -0.169; p-value < 
0.1). Liquidity of stocks traded, measured by the variable 
Liq (volume traded divided by Market Value of Equity), 
is not statistically significant.
The finding that leverage is decreasing in cash hol-
dings is in line with findings of other prior studies 
(Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Bigelli & 
Sanchez-Vidal, 2012; D’Mello et al., 2008). Also, it 
makes sense in light of Pecking Order, as these sources 
of funds can be considered alternative resources one to 
the other, because firms holding more cash would use 
this cash reserves to finance projects, having a lower 
need for external financing and hence employing less 
debt (Sunder & Myers, 1999).
Leverage as an increasing function of size is in line 
with former studies. Following Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), larger firms can use their assets base as a colla-
teral, and borrow more money at lower relative costs, 
hence being able to use more debt financing. Debt 
being increasing in investments signals that firms are 
financing growth opportunities with debt rather than 
with internal resources.
he last discussion on the irst model is about the rela-
tionship between debt and debt cost or gross cash low com-
mitment to pay the debt service (Financial Expenses over 
EBITDA). he econometric model supports an inverted U-
shaped relationship between these two variables, or, in other 
words, there would be a given level of gross cash low com-
mitment to repay debt that would maximize the debt level, 
as the coeicient for the liner term of FE/EBITDA is positive 
and the coeicient for the quadratic term for the variable is 
negative, being both statistically signiicant. Further, from 
that given point, it could be the case that debt becomes too 
expensive and, at the margin, starts to decrease. his result 
is in synergy with the argument of D’Mello et al. (2008), that 
irms paying higher service on their debts are more likely to 
face inancial distress, so debt levels are expected to fall at the 
margin as debt service cost rises.
This result, however, does not imply that firms over 
this maximum threshold are necessarily debt-constrai-
ned, as the result is derived from an average-median 
behavior. But the econometric result gives some intui-
tion that firms that commit too much of their gross cash 
flow generation paying financial expenses are likely to 
become constrained if this commitment becomes too 
elevated. This was the intuition that led us to set firms 
only in the 75% percentile of FE/EBITDA, instead of 
using the mean or median as a threshold, as candidates 
for being financially constrained firms when we desig-
ned the dummy we used for the model of Cash Holdin-
gs and Firm Value.
he second model we estimated had Cash Holdings, 
measured by Cash-to-Assets ratio as dependent variable, 
and short and long-term debt to capital as the main in-
dependent variables. Before presenting the results of this 
model, we present the results for the test of endogeneity of 
leverage and cash holdings:
 Table 3  Test of endogeneity (reduced equation)
Dep.Var:  
DebtToCapital
 KABł?EAJPO PR=HQA /K>QOP0"
SectorDebt 0.584* 1.88 0.311
sqrtMVE -0.001*** -3.34 0.001
NetCapex/TA 0.140* 1.67 0.084
PPE/TA -0.148*** -3.62 0.041
SGA/NOR -0.027** -2.17 0.012
NOR/TA -0.084** -2.20 0.038
Beta 0.005 0.68 0.008
Div.Yield -0.006 -0.46 0.001
Constr 0.075*** 4.27 0.017
F(9,209) 7.37***
N 1103
Firms 210
Adj. R-squared 0.041
DWatson 2.39
Var(u_i) 0.766
Max. correl. -0.27
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level
From the results of the reduced equation estimation, it 
can be seen that the instrument used, the Average Sector 
Debt, was indeed relevant, as its’ coeicient is statistically 
diferent from zero. Next table brings the results for the 
structural equation, including the residual of the reduced 
equation (Vit) as a regressor:
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 Table 4  Test of endogeneity (structural equation)
Dep.Var: 
CashAssets
 KABł?EAJPO PR=HQA /K>QOP0"
DebtToCapital -0.112*** -2.78 0.045
sqrtMVE -0.001 -0.65 0.001
NetCapex/TA -0.040 -0.64 0.063
PPE/TA -0.118** -2.19 0.056
SGA/NOR 0.011*** 12.80 0.001
NOR/TA -0.035 -1.33 0.028
Beta 0.005 1.27 0.004
Div.Yield 0.001 0.10 0.006
Constr 0.007 0.27 0.027
Vit 0.205 0.28 0.2920
F(10,208) 108.64***
N 1102
Firms 209
Adj. R-squared 0.087
DWatson 2.29
Var(u_i) 0.745
Max. correl. 0.28
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level
he regressor of interest in this regression is Vit, exac-
tly the residual of the reduced equation. As the coeicient 
for this variable is not statistically diferent from zero, the 
conclusion is that leverage and cash holdings are not endo-
genous, according to the test speciication presented in the 
previous section.
he next table brings the results for the regression that 
has cash holdings as dependent variable:
 Table 5  Determinants of cash holdings
Dep.Var:  
Cash Holdings
 KABł?EAJPO PR=HQA /K>QOP0"
stD/Cap -0.128*** -3.60 0.035
ltD/Cap -0.100** -2.02 0.049
SqrtMVE -0.001* -1.75 0.000
NetCapex/TA -0.030 -0.68 0.045
PPE/TA -0.130*** -4.30 0.030
SGA/NOR  0.011*** 22.9 0.000
NOR/TA -0.041*** -3.44 0.012
Beta 0.006 1.61 0.003
Div.Yield 0.000 0.01 0.000
Constr.Firms 0.013 1.07 0.012
Short and long-term Debt to Capital had both a ne-
gative marginal effect on Cash Holdings (-0.12; p-value 
< 0.01 / -0.10; p-value < 0.05, respectively), being the ne-
gative effect of short-term debt more pronounced. The 
proxy for Size (sqrtMVE) was negatively correlated to 
Cash Holdings (-0.001; p-value < 0.1), but with a coeffi-
cient close to zero. Net Capex to Assets (NetCapex/TA), 
our proxy for Growth / Investment Opportunities was 
not statistically significant. Tangible Assets (PPE/TA) 
had negative effect on Cash Holdings (-0.13; p-value 
< 0.01), whereas Discretionary Expenses (SGA/NOR) 
marginally increase Cash Holdings (0.01; p-value < 
0.01). Asset Turns (NOR/TA), the variable for operating 
efficiency, had negative relationship to Cash Holdings 
(-0.04; p-value < 0.01), while Beta, the proxy for firm 
risk, was not statistically different from zero, the same 
for the variables Dividend Yield and Constr (the dummy 
variable for potentially constrained firms).
The result that Cash Holdings is decreasing in debt 
is in line both with the previous result we found having 
Debt to Capital as dependent variable and Cash Holdin-
gs as independent variable, and also with prior studies. 
(Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Bigelli & San-
chez-Vidal, 2012). Because we split the Debt to Capital 
ratio to encompass the debt maturity, we could assess if 
the maturity of debt magnifies or reduces the negative 
impact of debt into cash holdings. Results suggest that 
Short-Term Debt has a slightly more negative impact on 
Cash Holdings than Long-Term Debt (coefficients are 
-0.12 x -0.10, respectively). If we assume that short-term 
debt is more likely to be used to finance immediate cash 
shortages, like for working capital necessities, and that 
long term debt is more likely to be used to finance invest-
ments, this result makes some sense, as cash holdings are 
liquid assets that firms can use in case of an immediate 
need to cover working capital shortage, as short-term 
debt, at least in Brazil, is quite expensive money. But as 
the difference in the coefficients is small, we leave this 
finding as possibility to be further developed.
According to the regression results, firms holding 
more tangible assets are likely to hold less cash, in line 
with John (1993). On the other hand, firms with more 
discretionary expenses, like advertising, research, 
selling expenses, etc, hold higher cash balances, which 
is in line with former studies (Opler et al., 1999). Regar-
F(10,215) 119.9***
N 1101
Firms 209
Adj. R-squared 0.091
DWatson 2.27
Var(u_i) 0.7448
Max. correl. 0.36
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level
continuous
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ding to Operating Efficiency / Performance, we found 
that Asset Turns and Cash Holdings are negatively cor-
related. Instead, previous studies suggested that firms 
holding larger cash balances usually are more efficient 
(Mikkelson & Partch, 2003).
Cash Holdings is decreasing in Size, implying that smal-
ler irms are likely to hold larger cash reserves, in synergy 
with former studies (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004; Opler et al., 
1999; D’Mello et al., 2008).
The dummy variable we used to capture financially 
constrained firms showed positive coefficient, sug-
gesting cash holdings would be increasing in financial 
constraints. Unfortunately, because the coefficient is 
not statistically significant, we cannot corroborate this 
important result of prior research (as in Acharya et al., 
2007; Almeida & Campello, 2007).
However, it is possible that we captured some part 
of the idea of financially constrained firms with other 
variable in the model, which is size. It is reasonable to 
assume that smaller firms are likely to suffer more from 
financial constraints, as they do not have valuable assets 
to offer as a collateral to back the debt service, and may 
run out of cheap debt loans. This is especially pronoun-
ced in Brazil, building on Terra (2003). Thus, as the mo-
del supports that cash holdings is decreasing in size, and 
assuming that financially constrained firms are likely to 
be smaller, the model may have indirectly captured some 
of the positive relationship between financial constraint 
and cash holdings, as suggested by Acharya et al. (2007), 
D’Mello et al. (2008), among others.
 Table 6  Firm value
Dep.Var:  
Mkt-to-Book
 KABł?EAJPO PR=HQA /K>QOP0"
stD/Cap -0.707** -2.24 0.316
ltD/Cap -0.953*** -2.93 0.325
C/TA 2.466*** 3.54 0.695
(C/TA)sq -2.620** -2.14 1.222
Constr -0.153*** -3.33 0.046
NetCapex/TA 0.391 1.27 0.300
lnNOR 0.062 1.22 0.050
Liq -0.132*** -3.35 0.039
ROIC 0.018** 2.01 0.009
stDebtxConstr 0.010 0.04 0.292
ltDebtxConstr 0.002 0.02 0.156
CashxConstr -0.502 -1.43 0.352
F(12,287) 7.49***
N 2038
Firms 288
Adj. R-squared 0.1575
DWatson 2.02
Var(u_i) 0.6878
Max. correl. 0.35
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level
Table 6 reports the results for the third model estima-
ted. Recalling, the idea of this model was to evaluate how 
investors perceive financing and cash policies, by assessing 
the impact of these policies on the firm value.
The Market-to-Book ratio is decreasing in Short-
Term Debt to Capital (-0.70; p-value < 0.05) and in 
Long-Term Debt to Capital (-0.95; p-value <0.01). For 
Cash Holdings, the relationship is positive for the linear 
form (2.46; p-value < 0.01), but decreasing for the qua-
dratic form (-2.62; p-value < 0.05). Constrained Firms 
have their market value further discounted by inves-
tors when compared to unconstrained firms (-0.15; p-
value < 0.01). The controlling variables for profitability 
(ROIC) and for liquidity (Liq) were statistically signi-
ficant in the regression. The controls for size (log of 
Net Operating Revenues), investment (NetCapex/TA), 
as well as the interactions between short and long-term 
debt and cash holdings with the dummy for constrai-
ned firms were not statistically significant.
The result that both short and long-term debt causes 
marginal discounting in the market value of firms may 
reflect some kind of risk aversion of investors, trying to 
interpret that as an averaged behavior, as higher leve-
rage tends to be associated with higher stock volatility 
(Lewellen, 2006). Indeed, as the Brazilian stock market 
is marked by high volatility (Perez & Famá, 2006), one 
possibility is that investors would prefer firms to finan-
ce their investments with other securities than debt, 
like equity or internally generated funds, to mitigate 
the already present problem of volatility, making re-
turns more stable. As firms, instead, must employ at 
least some level of debt in their financing structure, 
the negative marginal effect of debt into market value 
could be possibly interpreted as a risk-aversion reply 
from investors.
The fact that long-term debt caused a stronger dis-
count on the market performance, when compared to 
short-term debt, was unexpected, because short-term 
interest rates are usually higher. One alternative ex-
planation could be that, although short-term credit is 
more expensive, because it is due in a shorter period, 
the risk stemming from this debt can be better asses-
sed by investors, because it is due in a shorter maturity, 
and investors can foresee more easily possible proble-
ms with this outstanding debt in the short term. On the 
other hand, because the state of the economy is more 
uncertain in the long run, maybe the risk of debt due 
in longer periods is harder to be assessed, causing in-
vestors to further discount the market value of firms 
with long-term leverage. A negative relationship be-
tween higher levels of debt and stock market returns 
or market value of equity is in line with the findings of 
Dimitrov and Jain (2008), who reported that growing 
debt is associated to negative stock market returns. Ho-
wever, Masulis (1983) reported opposite results when 
studying US listed firms, as he found that changes in 
leverage were positively related to both stock returns 
and to firm value.
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Firm value was found to be increasing in the linear 
form of Cash Holdings, but decreasing in the quadratic 
form, suggesting an inverted U-shaped curve relationship. 
Prior evidence suggested that cash holdings are value-
enhancing if cash balances are optimal (Ferreira & Vilela, 
2004; Opler et al., 1999). In other words, static trade-off 
theory predicts that there is a target-level of cash holdings 
that maximizes firm value. The results of the model give 
support to static trade-off theory, in the sense that it su-
pports the existence of an optimum value of cash. Firm 
value would be increasing in cash up to a given threshold 
value, but, from that point, value would start to be dis-
counted. Investors may value the precautionary feature of 
high cash balances, as argued by Bates et al. (2009), but 
not in a monotonic way, as excess cash balances may sig-
nal high opportunity costs of funds, or also an inefficient 
payout policy, because holding cash may have non-zero 
cost, and some part of the excess cash could be distributed 
as dividends (Opler et al., 1999). One further reason for 
the discount on higher values of cash could be linked to 
the agency problem of leaving too much cash in the ma-
nagers’ hand, as they could invest in low-profit projects 
and spend the excess cash in perquisites (Jensen, 1986).
In the Brazilian context, we understand that an 
optimum point of cash makes sense, because there is 
a marked restriction in credit markets, specially for 
small firms, but also a high opportunity cost of capital, 
as interest rates are historically higher when compared 
to more developed economies. Then too little cash can 
be viewed as a bad thing, but also too much cash may 
not be the best option, suggesting there should be a ba-
lance point.
The dummy variable we set to differentiate potentially 
constrained firms versus unconstrained firms showed to 
be statistically significant and had negative coefficient. 
Interpretation is that constrained firms have lower ma-
rket value, when compared to the baseline-unconstrai-
ned firm. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of 
risk aversion that we proposed for the negative impact of 
debt in the market value, as firms paying a high fraction 
of their gross cash generated in debt servicing may be 
more prone to face financial distress, thus being riskier, 
and hence suffering further discounting. The interaction 
between this dummy and short and long-term debt, as 
well as the interaction with cash holdings, were not sta-
tistically significant.
 5 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
The objective of this study was to analyze how capital 
structure and cash holdings are related in the Brazilian firms 
setting, and further evaluate the impact of these important 
financial variables on the firm value.  We found evidence 
that leverage and cash holdings are negatively related at the 
margin. Higher levels of cash balances are associated to less 
leverage, and more levered firms are likely to hold less cash. 
The finding was in line with former researches, and can 
also be interpreted in light of Pecking Order theory, as fir-
ms would prefer to finance investments with retained ear-
nings (encompassed by cash holdings), recurring to debt 
as a second option to finance investments when they run 
short of cash. Hence, it makes sense those higher levels of 
cash to be associated to lower debt ratios, and vice-versa.
We also found evidence that higher levels of leverage 
end up constraining firms to issue more debt, as the gross 
cash generated that is committed to repay debt, once it 
reaches a given threshold, causes debt to fall at the mar-
gin. If we consider that small firms are more likely to be 
financially constrained, as former research and theory 
suggest, we found indirect evidence that more constrai-
ned firms hold more cash.
Regarding to the impact of leverage (short and long-
term) and cash holdings on firm value, the results of this 
study suggest that leverage causes firm value discounts, 
whereas cash balances are valued positively by investors, 
but up to a certain level. Further from that given level, 
the market value of firm is decreasing in cash holdings. 
Additionally, the firms we set as financially constrained 
were further discounted in their market values, when 
compared to the ones set as unconstrained.
We interpreted these results as signaling a somewhat 
risk-averse behavior of investors with respect to levera-
ge, because leverage could induce an even higher vola-
tility to stock returns, and financially constrained firms 
are more subject to financial distress risks. Regarding to 
cash holdings, the results suggest that the accumulation 
of cash balances is positive, as it potentially shields the 
firm’s future investments against possible future cash 
constraints, but not in a monotonic fashion: too much 
cash causes market discounts, possibly due to escalated 
opportunity costs of money, inefficient payout policy or 
agency costs of leaving too much cash disposable to ma-
nagers’ spending.
We point out that our study has some important li-
mitations. First, we addressed the issue of financially 
constrained firms using a different approach when 
compared to prior studies, mainly due to data availabi-
lity. The dummy variable we used may not have subs-
tantially captured the capital constraint faced by firms, 
despite the fact that we understand that the dummy cap-
tured some features of the problem, and some other fe-
atures were indirectly captured by other variable (size). 
Second, also related to financial constraints, we failed 
to conciliate it with sensitivity to cash flows, invest-
ment and tangibility, in light of prior studies (Acharya 
et al, 2007; Almeida & Campello, 2007). These more 
robust relationships should be addressed in future stu-
dies. Another variable that we failed to conciliate in 
our study is the role of taxes in both cash holdings and 
leverage determinants. Further papers should include 
this variable in the analysis.
Finally, we estimated three separate models for leverage, 
cash holdings and firm value, based on our understanding 
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of what the current theory could support. Our interpre-
tation was that simultaneous equations were not the best 
choice, especially to model firm value, cash holdings and 
leverage. For the relationship between cash holdings and 
leverage, we provided evidence that variables were not en-
dogenous, at least for our model specification. Thus, we 
opted for estimating separate regressions.
However, clearly, these are matters of interpretation, and 
further studies could and should try to explore other specifica-
tions, provided the theoretical base to do so is well developed. 
We acknowledge that modeling the three variables separately 
can be considered a limitation, but by not building on more 
complicated assumptions that we found no strong support in 
the theory, we understand that we stood on the safe side. The 
models we estimated can be considered simple, but our view 
is that they were correctly specified and yielded interesting re-
sults, specially when considering that there were not so many 
studies before that attempted to study these three variables al-
together. But for sure the models suggested in this study leave 
room for more robust specifications.
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